Foia Release Unclassified Complete

23 AARO Brief ATB

Department of Defense. Office of the Secretary of Defense. (09/18/1947 - )

Released
Jun 15, 2026
Published
Added to archive
Jun 15, 2026
Department
Department of Defense. Office of the Secretary of Defense. (09/18/1947 - )
Original size
6.3 MB
External ID
nara:naid:493468580:file:23_AARO_Brief_ATB.pdf
Confidence
60%
Credibility
70%

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Intelligence summary

ALL- DOMAIN ANOMALY RESOLUTION OFFICE DoD PPR Approved Slide, Case 23-S-0802 UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of Defense & Office of the Director of National Intelligence UNCLASSIFIED The Defense Department’s UAP Mission & Civil Aviation Seán Kirkpatrick, Ph.D. Director 023 Page determined to be Unclassified Reviewed by Chief of Staff, AARO IAW FY24 NDAA, Section 1841 (a)(1)(C) Date: 02/06/2025 All-Domain Anomaly Resolution Office Chief of Staff, AARO Authority: FY24 NDAA, now codified a

Linked cases

Locations referenced

LocationContextConfidenceSupporting text
US strategic Incident Location Unresolved …tion currency and source reliability Consequence of UAP in the vicinity of strategic capabilities is high, potentially threatening strategic deterrence and sa

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Jun 15, 2026

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23 AARO Brief ATB

Jun 15, 2026

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23 AARO Brief ATB

Jun 15, 2026

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Jun 15, 2026

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ALL- DOMAIN ANOMALY RESOLUTION OFFICE DoD PPR Approved Slide, Case 23-S-0802 UNCLASSIFIED U.S. Department of Defense & Office of the Director of National Intelligence UNCLASSIFIED The Defense Department’s UAP Mission & Civil Aviation Seán Kirkpatrick, Ph.D. Director 023 Page determined to be Unclassified Reviewed by Chief of Staff, AARO IAW FY24 NDAA, Section 1841 (a)(1)(C) Date: 02/06/2025 All-Domain Anomaly Resolution Office Chief of Staff, AARO Authority: FY24 NDAA, now codified at 44 U.S.C. 2107 Date: 02/06/2025 Released in Full: ____X___; Released in Part ___ Case Number: 330UAP000023 2 DoD PPR Approved Slide, Case 23-S-0802 U.S. Department of Defense & Office of the Director of National Intelligence UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED AARO emerged from Congressional and Departmental recognition that UAP present complex hazardsand threatsacross service, regional, and domain boundaries. What is the ALL-DOMAINANOMALY RESOLUTIONOFFICE(AARO)? What outcomes does AARO aim to produc e? How will AARO resolve phenomena? How are AARO’s mission r espo nsibilities applicable to you? Anomalous observation smaterial, behavioral, or capability attributes perceived to be beyond known performance envelops UNIDENTIFIEDANOMALOUSPHENOMENA UAPare sources of anomalous spaceborne, airborne, seaborne, or transmedium observations that are not yet attributable to known actors or causes 023 Page determined to be Unclassified Reviewed by Chief of Staff, AARO IAW FY 24 NDAA, Section 1841 (a)(1)(C) Date: 02/06/2025 3 DoD PPR Approved Slide, Case 23-S-0802 U.S. Department of Defense & Office of the Director of National Intelligence UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED AARO is a uniquely-capable, Defense Department organization that integrates operational,scientific, and intelligencecapabilities to resolve UAP. our mission minimize technical and intelligence surprise, by synchronizing scientific, intelligence, and operational detection, identification, attribution, and mitigation of unidentified, anomalous objects in the vicinity of national security areas our vision unidentified, anomalous objects are effectively and efficiently detected, tracked, analyzed, and managed by way of normalized DoD, IC, and civil business practices; by adherence to the highest scientific and intelligence-tradecraft standards; and with greater transparency and shared awareness key scientific and intelligence questions Physical, technical, behavioral, and contextual characteristicsof phenomena, their composition, and their movement Capabilities, limitations, and vulnerabilitiesof phenomena and any assessed technological gap between phenomena and the United States Indications and characteristics of hazards, risksand/or threatsby phenomena to the United States, its people, its equities, and/or its instruments of national power Attributionof phenomena to natural and/or artificial sources Indications of foreign observation of and reaction to phenomena The dispositionof observed phenomena 023 Page determined to be Unclassified Reviewed by Chief of Staff, AARO IAW FY24 NDAA, Section 1841 (a)(1)(C) Date: 02/06/2025 4 DoD PPR Approved Slide, Case 23-S-0802 U.S. Department of Defense & Office of the Director of National Intelligence UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED The potentially ubiquitous presence of UAP defines the national-security implications and drives the broad range ofstakeholders and demand for rigorous scientific understanding of and intelligence on phenomena US Territory & Operating Areas DoD observations and reporting of UAP most often in the vicinity of US military facilities and operating areas Threats to the immediate safety of US citizens and Government facilities, across domains, is priority Safety and security risks of UAP heighten US Government awareness and drives research and mitigation efforts Key partners and stakeholders include DoD, IC, DoJ, NASA, FAA US Strategic Capabilities Reporting on UAP proximity to strategic capabilities and critical infrastructure primarily historical; analysis limited by information currency and source reliability Consequence of UAP in the vicinity of strategic capabilities is high, potentially threatening strategic deterrence and safety of civil society DoD strengthening observations and reporting capabilities near US strategic capabilities and critical infrastructure Key partners and stakeholders include DoD, IC, DoE and NNSA, DoJ, DHS Reporting on UAP activity in foreign territory or operating areas limited by source reliability Consequence of such moderate-to- high, potentially leading to adversarial misattribution of UAP to the United States Allies and strategic competitors apply resources to observe, identify, and attribute UAP (open source) Key partners and stakeholders include DoD, IC, STATE, international partners 023 Page determined to be Unclassified Reviewed by Chief of Staff, AARO IAW FY24 NDAA, Section 1841 (a)(1)(C) Date: 02/06/2025 5 DoD PPR Approved Slide, Case 23-S-0802 U.S. Department of Defense & Office of the Director of National Intelligence UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED AARO leads integration of the Department’s UAP operations, research, analyses, and strategic-communicationsto deliver exquisite data, advanced sensors, sound analytics, and shared mission awareness and ownership synchronizing and sequencing Theater, IC, and other capabilities for optimized, cross- functional UAP detection, tracking, mitigation, and recovery Integrated-Operations revealing and exploiting elusive and enigmatic signatures through advanced technologies and focused, cross- sector partnerships S&T Research & Application delivering peer-reviewed conclusions through deliberate syntheses of scientific and intelligence method, tradecraft, tools, and expertise Interdisciplinary Analyses driving shared awareness across mission partners, oversight authorities, and stakeholders— normalizing cross-sector partnerships and building trust with transparency Focused Communications 023 Page determined to be Unclassified Reviewed by Chief of Staff, AARO IAW FY24 NDAA, Section 1841 (a)(1)(C) Date: 02/06/2025 6 DoD PPR Approved Slide, Case 23-S-0802 U.S. Department of Defense & Office of the Director of National Intelligence UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Our mission success and our ability to contribute to aviation safety depends on observations and insights from the aviation community Educate Aviators and Crews The subject of UAP is laden with decades of imprecise—and often sensational— information Promulgating accurate information about UAP, their implications to flight safety and national security, and our commitment to resolving them is foundational to our partnership with the community. Sharing what UAP data is critically- important for scientific and intelligence analyses allows aviators and crews to optimize the value of their observations and reporting of phenomena Encourage Reporting Historically, reticence to UAP reporting has limited the Government’s ability to guard against aerial safety and security threats Destigmatizing discussion aboutand reporting ofUAP is essential for tracking, resolving, and defending against such phenomena Government efforts to encourage military aviators and crews to report phenomena have substantially increased the quantity and quality of UAP data Updating Civil Aviation Reporting Mechanism Leverage Our Expertise & Systems Aviators and crews informed about UAP and willing to report have historically had few official channels to submit observational data We are working with military, civil, and industry partners to develop and field reporting mechanisms available to aviators and crews By leveraging our systems, we will be able to quickly incorporate aviators’ and crews’ reporting into the corpus of data, to optimize scientific and intelligence analyses, and to provide feedback to the reporting individual and/or organization 023 Page determined to be Unclassified Reviewed by Chief of Staff, AARO IAW FY24 NDAA, Section 1841 (a)(1)(C) Date: 02/06/2025 7 DoD PPR Approved Slide, Case 23-S-0802 U.S. Department of Defense & Office of the Director of National Intelligence UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED What kind of information would be necessary and sufficient for UAP analyses? about the phenomenon UAP-event description or narrative UAP location relative to the observer, with as much precision as practicable Number of UAP-objects observed during the phenomenon and indications of intra UAP-object coordination and/or communication Indications of advanced and/or enigmatic capabilities UAP characteristics, including physical state (e.g., solid, liquid, gas, plasma); description (e.g., size, shape, color); signatures; propulsion means; payload UAP performance envelope, including altitude and/or depth; travel path and trajectory; velocity; maneuverability UAP behavior, including whether under apparent intelligent control, apparent response to observation and/or observer presence, and apparent indications of indifference or hostility about the observer Observer’s date, time, location, and travel path for first and last observation of the UAP, with as much precision as practicable Observer’s behavior toward the UAP Sensors that detected the phenomenon (e.g., visual, radar) Any physiological, psychological, or other effects apparently corresponding to the UAP observation Observer’s assessment of the UAP, including the nature of the phenomenon and whether it was benign, a hazard, or a threat Identification of any other observers 023 Page determined to be Unclassified Reviewed by Chief of Staff, AARO IAW FY24 NDAA, Section 1841 (a)(1)(C) Date: 02/06/2025 U.S. Department of Defense & Office of the Director of National Intelligence UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED Seán Kirkpatrick, Ph.D. Director 023 Page determined to be Unclassified Reviewed by Chief of Staff, AARO IAW FY24 NDAA, Section 1841 (a)(1)(C) Date: 02/06/2025