Military Report
Unclassified Complete
733667-001-023
National Archives and Records Administration
Confidence
85%
Credibility
90%
View original document ↗ hosted at the official government source
Intelligence summary
This document discusses the radar data analysis related to Japan Airlines flight 1628, which reported an unidentified flying object (UFO) on November 17, 1986. The FAA's review of radar data indicated the presence of 'uncorrelated primary and beacon targets,' which are not uncommon and can occur due to timing discrepancies in radar systems.
Tags & topics
Linked cases
Locations referenced
| Location | Context | Confidence | Supporting text |
|---|---|---|---|
| Atlantic City, NJ | Incident Location | Medium | …Radar data received by the FAA and used to track Japan Airlines flight 1628 on the night of the November 17, 1986, was retained by FAA. Review of this radar da |
Extracted timeline
Jun 15, 1987
Document Date (year hint)
Document Date (year hint) for 733667-001-023
Jun 16, 2026
Ingestion Date
Ingestion Date for 733667-001-023
Jun 16, 2026
Document Record Date
Document Record Date for 733667-001-023
Jun 16, 2026
Update Date
Update Date for 733667-001-023
Entities mentioned
Full document text
5,554 characters, transcribed via OCR. Errors reflect the source scan. Compare with the original ↗
Paul Steucke
FAA Public Affairs
701 C Street, Box 14
Anch. AK 99513
March 5, 1987
tlNCORRELATED RADAR SIGNALS
Radar data received by the FAA and used to track Japan Airlines flight 1628
on the night of the November 17, 1986, was retained by FAA. Review of this
radar data by FAA experts using identical equipment at the FAA's research
technical center in Atlantic City, New Jersey, revealed that the radar system
was receiving what is called an "uncorrelated primary and beacon target".
This electronic phenomena is not unusual according to Steucke who said, "It
is unfortunate that the uncorrelated target phenomena occurred just when a
pilot was reporting seeing something outside his aircraft.
The controller's statements, released by the FAA, indicate that they thought
there might be another aircraft or object in the area of the JAL flight.
Steucke said, "The controllers were doing their job right because they have to
work with what is right there in front of them on the screen, especially when
you have a Captain that is reporting "other traffic" in his immediate area.
The radar data they had was one target, moving slowly across the radar screen.
They don't have the benefit of "monday morning quarterbacking" with multiple
radar images as was the case in regenerating the radar data." Review of the
radar data by FAA experts revealed the "uncorrelated target" phenomena.
FAA electronic technicians explained that an "uncorrelated primary and
beacon target" on the radar screen occurs when the radar energy that is sent up
toward the aircraft, (primary signal) returns to the radar receiver along with
the aircraft transponder (beacon) signal and the two do not match up as being
at the same exact location.
II II II
J
I
I
~
,..J
H
~
'1'
-
-
UNCORRELATED RADAR SIGNALS
An "uncorrelated primary and beacon(secondary) return on a radar
screen occurs when the radar energy that is sent up toward the aircraft
(primary signal) returns off the surface of the aircraft at a slightly
different moment than tbe beacon (secondary) transponder signal and the
two do not match up as being at the same place or same computer radar
cell.
--RADAR COMPUTER CELL, 1/4 MILE--
SECONDARY
RADAR
RETURN
(Beacon)
(Transponder)
--1!
FAA
RADAR
SAME AIRCRAFT
(Skin-
Surf ace)
--//'-
RADAR CELL
=PRIMARY RAD~ RETURN
=SECONDARY RADAR RETURN
=CORRELATED RETURN
(Combined Return)
Drawing by Paul Steucke
March 5, 1987
=UNCORRELATED RETURN
Memorandum
U.S. Department
of
Transportation
Federal Aviation
Administration
Subjec t INFORMATION: Description of Radar Split Image;
AAL-5 Meno of 2/5/87
From Manager, Aii:way Facilities Division, AAL-400
To Public Affairs Officer, AAL-5
Date:
Reply to
A ttn. o f:
FEB 2 7 1987
'!his letter transmits our analysis of the radar targets associated with
JAL flight 1628, on November 17, 1986, and supplements discussions we have
had regarding what has been referred to as "split illlages".
We concur with the interpretation provided to you by the Alaskan Region
Air Traffic Division.
'nle attached Analysis of Uncorrelated Primary an:i Beacon Targets by Dennis
Silllantel covers the subject in roc>re detail, and addresses the questions
raised in your letter.
Paul, I appreciate the team approach you have taken to more fully
urrlerstarrl a complex issue. '!he issue is an excellent example of how
"interdepen:lent" we are. If we can provide any more information, please
i!iC.
David F. Morse
A
ttachment
,.......,
__,
::0
-..,
.,,
rn
CD
·=
CJ
--J
rn
-
<
·-
fT1
CJ
r-.,_J
._ .. ,
I
I
ANALYsrs OF UNCORRELATED PRIMARY
AND BEACON TARGETS
(JAL-1628, 11/17/86 AKST)
Approximately 61 minutes of data was extracted from the EARTS CDR
printouts relating to the November 18 incident involving JAL-1628
and the alleged UFO sighting.
Review of the data involving this incident did not show any
abnormalities that could be associated with any type of target as
indicated by the pilot· of JAL-1628.
Radar returns from the aircraft and surrounding terrain vary with
the different segments of the flight, but are considered normal
for the area.
Returns relating to the incident can be categorized as three
types: primary radar reinforced by a beacon reply (primary radar
returns and beacon returns are both evident in the same 1/4 mile
range cell), beacon only reply and beacon with an associated
radar reply. Seventy-two percent of the replies were radar with
beacon reinforcement (same range cell) which is normal for the
Murphy dome radar system.
Approximately 25 percent were beacon only and of those that
registered as beacon only, 90 percent of those had a primary only
reply within 1/8 of a mile, either ahead or behind the beacon
target (..&'behind, M ahead).
~ ~/3/87 ~ 13
These uncorrelated primary returns are not uncommon, due to the
critic al timing associated with the delay adjustments in the
aircraft transponder for beacon systems and the target
correlation circuitry within the radar equipment.
When an aircraft is being interrogated as it passes through the
beginning of adjacent range cells the intricate timing between
the two systems very often is off just enough to declare both a
beacon and a radar target in different range cells, resulting in
uncorrelated radar replies.
The data derived from the JAL-1628 flight is representative of
the data from another aircraft in the same general area and is
considered normal.
February 25, 1987
~s.
"Dennis R. Simantel
ZAN-AAL-ARTCC
I